I really like the idea of monster wargames! Lots of counters, multiple maps, an encyclopedic rulebook with 50+ pages. These concepts all sound really inviting and interesting to me. But, in reality when I get a monster wargame, not that I have purchased many, I begin to sweat bullets thinking about the clipping and organization of 1,000+ counters, reading through those encyclopedic rule books and finding table space to splay out and play on 5 maps the size of Texas. And the folks at Thin Red Line Games specialize in monsters! They have a whole line of them and they all look amazing including the C3 Series, focused on Command, Control and Communication and pioneered by Less Than 60 Miles. One of my favorite things about Thin Red Line Games is that Fabrizio speaks in his military jargon so fluently that it is such a thematic boost to the games they produce. Last year, we posted an interview covering their most recent Cold War Gone Hot game called Die Festung Hamburg and now they recently released their newest Module in the C3 Series called In a Dark Wood and it sold out within days. I reached out to Fabrizio to try and get some intel into the SOP’s of In a Dark Wood and just what lies within that monster box that is so appealing to so many.

Grant: Welcome back to the blog Fabrizio. What is the focus of your newest entry in the C3 Series called In a Dark Wood?

Fabrizio: In a Dark Wood expands our C3 Series, describing a hypothetical NATO – Warsaw Pact conflict in central Europe in 1985. This fourth module covers the US VII Corps Area of Responsibility in southern West Germany and includes the (in)famous Hof Gap.

Grant: What is the meaning of the title?

Fabrizio: One of the peculiarities of this sector of the front is the high concentration of forested areas, creating different problems and challenges for both sides. This definitely sets the mood, so the opening words of Dante’s Divine Comedy sounded perfect: “In the middle of our life’s journey, I found myself in a dark wood.”

Grant: What do you think is the attraction to these 1985 what if style wargames?

Fabrizio: Most of us were born during the Cold War, and we grew up[ under the dark shadow of a nuclear holocaust and a Soviet offensive to “liberate Europe from the capitalist yoke”. I think it is natural that our passion for military and historical subjects pushes us to explore how a conflict that has marked our youth would have ended. After all, it is one of the biggest what-if’s of the twentieth century!

Grant: What was your inspiration for this game? Why did you feel drawn to the subject?

Fabrizio: I’ve always thought that some of the inner, most important mechanisms of warfare were not sufficiently explored in wargames, particularly for the modern period. Most were too predictable, computable and immediate. This is usually intentional and not an oversight by the designer, as he must decide from the start which aspects will be covered in detail, and which ones will be left in the background.

NATO: Division Commander stood as one of the few exceptions, at least until a few years ago. and after reading about John Boyd and playing the exceptional Flashpoint Campaigns: Red Storm by Matrix Games I made up my mind; I wanted a game covering how war is organized and waged, as seen from the command post.

Grant: What was your design goal with the game?

Fabrizio: What I wanted was a simulation forcing  the players to face some of the unpleasant and often neglected problems of a real division or corps commander in a modern conflict, abandoning the standard approach where everything is quantifiable and happens instantly. This was a risky design choice, as the player faces a simulation that is trying to make it harder and not easier to execute his plans. Instinct and improvisation are not enough anymore, you need to think ahead and follow a realistic plan in order to have a chance to survive. Luckily, a lot of Grognards were up to the challenge!

In the C3 Series, time constraints and uncertainty are two key factors that must be accounted for. Some practical examples are:

  • Every plan has its own inertia. Once it has started, changing it requires time, probably more time than the enemy will concede.
  • Not much happens immediately, as things must be planned, executed, and coordinated. A formation defending a sector cannot switch to a full scale counterattack in zero time, as orders for its maneuver units must be prepared, executed, and coordinated with nearby formations and available fire support.
  • If your command staff is busy reacting  to an emergency in a sector, it will have little or no time for decisions and orders in another area of the front.
  • Combat is the realm of uncertainty. You cannot simply add one point of artillery and attack on the 2:1 column, the best you can do is a generic assessment of how the situation could develop giving the involved forces, fire assets and support.

So, you need a brigade to defend a key city? Needs 9 hours to properly prepare. Want a division to make an all-out assault to a strong enemy position? Send out orders, maybe the assault could begin tomorrow at dawn. Has that battalion enough fire support for the mission? You will know only when it’s too late to change you idea. Need fresh troops to plug a hole in the front line? If you have not kept real reserves, you are royally fracked.

Grant: What type of research did you do to get the details correct? What one must read source would you recommend?

Fabrizio: Well, as probably most of us I’ve been reading practically everything I could put my hands on about modern mechanized warfare, cold war, and military doctrine in the ‘80s.

Contributions from professional military officers during development was also essential, as it helped to analyze and understand the inner workings of the modern C3 chain and the real, under-the-hood problems that a commander must face. Their support also gave us access to several unpublished and impossible to find documents covering the NATO deployment and doctrine in 1985.

Regarding the sources, I recommend the following as a starter:

David Miller (2012): The Cold War – A Military History
U.S. Army (1982): FM 100-5 Operations
U.S. Army (1984): FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army – Operations and Tactics
U.S. Army (1991): FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army – Troops, Organization and Equipment
U.S. Army (1994): FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

Once you are ready for a deeper, philosophical approach to the military dilemmas, it is time for Patterns of Conflict by John Boyd. This could really change how you look at warfare and conceive your plans (more on this later!).

Grant: What other published games have given you inspiration on this project?

Fabrizio: SPI’s The Next War, Central Front Series, and NATO: Division Commander were the cornerstones that inspired me in creating the C3 Series.

These games pioneered several concepts used and refined in the C3 Series:

  • Combat as a function of movement, allowing the implementation of a detailed attack-breakthrough-exploit strategy typical of modern mechanized warfare.
  • Attrition, allowing the representation of how the efficiency of a military unit degrades for a variety of reasons, not always connected to combat or losses.
  • Tactical deployment, making the orders and deployment of a unit critical for its movement and combat capabilities.
  • Combat uncertainty, as in most cases, both sides only have an approximate idea of the combat odds.

Grant: What about 1985 and the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is important to model in the game?

Fabrizio: The big news in this module are the French armed forces on the NATO side, and the two Czechoslovakian armies on the Warsaw Pact side.

The French forces were particularly challenging to research and represent, as in several aspects they have a very different approach than the other NATO countries. Doctrine is focused more on counterattack than on defense, and the equipment and organization of the French formations often reflect that. Political considerations were also important, as French forces would have remained under French control even in the case of war.

Grant: How have you gone about modeling the military doctrine, tactics and peculiarities for both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces?

Fabrizio: I’m a big fan of the “Design for Cause” school, so we didn’t try to model the doctrine or tactics by writing specific rules. There are of course exceptions, but in most cases the doctrine and the tactics for each side are the result of the building blocks we placed as basic structure. For example, Warsaw Pact needs to echelon its forces to avoid a gigantic traffic jam; NATO needs to keep reserves at brigade, division and even corps level to avoid a collapse should the enemy achieve a breakthrough; Artillery must stay behind the contact line, or risk being vaporized by enemy counter-battery fire or air strikes; NATO command system is less centralized than in Warsaw Pact, therefore it is more flexible and reactive.

Grant: What is the scale and force structure of units? How has this choice in the design assisted you in telling this story?

Fabrizio: The maneuver unit is the battalion for NATO and the regiment for Warsaw Pact. The force structure then expands to Brigade -> Division -> Corps for NATO, and to Division -> Army -> Front for Warsaw Pact. This choice allowed me to represent several peculiarities of the two armed forces, like the extreme flexibility and resilience of West German brigades, and the restrained, top-down approach of the Warsaw Pact command structure.

In the end, Warsaw Pact has fewer command HQ’s authorized to take independent decisions, making it much more difficult to change the initial plans or to react to unexpected events during combat.

Grant: What is the anatomy of the counters? Can you share several examples of units for comparison?

Fabrizio: A basic combat unit has the following information on its counter:

  • A standard NATO symbol defining the type of unit.
  • A silhouette of the main equipment used.
  • Attack and defense values, more correctly defined as “armored combat” and “combined arms combat” values.
  • A Cadre Rating, defining immaterial aspects like training level, CO’s quality and will to fight.
  • Amphibious crossing capability.
  • “Soft” target identification, when the unit has few or no armored AFV’s and is therefore more vulnerable to artillery fire.
  • Designation.
  • Parent HQ, in black if the unit can be attached to a different, lower-level HQ.
  • A coloured band indicating the higher-level formation.

Support Units follow the same guidelines, but each one has specific piece of information related to its utilization:

  • Artillery and Missile units have full strength bombardment, reduced strength bombardment and range.
  • Helicopters have strike strength and range.
  • HQ units have Command Range and possible EW capability.

Grant: What is the OODA Loop? How is it a hallmark of your system?

Fabrizio: The Observe – Orient – Decide – Act loop was first theorized by John Boyd. It has been used by military planners as one of the core concepts for developing the Air Land Battle and Counter-Strike doctrine, and also found application in several non-military fields. In my opinion, its most important innovation was the introduction of a completely new method to analyze the battlefield, focused on how quickly a military unit of any size can react to new information and to an evolving situation. The commander’s goal becomes “to collapse the adversary’s system into confusion and disorder causing him to over and under react to activity that appears simultaneously menacing as well as ambiguous, chaotic, or misleading. “

In Boyd’s doctrine, victory on the battlefield depends on the speed and efficiency of a side’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) cycle. The faster a force can complete this loop, the better it can adapt to the dynamics of combat. If an opponent’s OODA cycle is slower, they risk falling behind the pace of events, reacting to situations that have already changed or making decisions based on outdated information. This lag creates openings to exploit, as their responses become increasingly misaligned with reality.

In the C3 System, very few actions can be completed immediately, and the time needed heavily depends on having a working command chain, a command staff not overloaded with other tasks, and by the tactical situation of the unit on the battlefield. A cunning commander can exploit the enemy’s slowness to take him off-guard, or to have him react in an inappropriate manner to the unfolding events. As an example, an entire Soviet army could be plunged into chaos by a well-executed and well-timed counterattack from a single NATO brigade.

Grant: What role do cards play in the game? What type of cards are included?

Fabrizio: There are two types of cards: Events that could happen randomly at any turn, and Actions that are voluntarily played at specific moments during the turn. Events are problems or opportunities over which the player has no direct control including things such as misinterpreted orders, direct hits on command centers, found information from captured enemy officers or spies, decryption of enemy communication codes, and more. Actions are strategic or tactical options under the direct control of the player including pre-planned air strikes, airmobile operations, Special Forces raids on high-value targets, and so on.

The cards available to each side depend by the scenario being played. Here’s some of my favorites:

Grant: How can this game be played along with the other modules covering the whole Central Front?

Fabrizio: The combined campaign, titled July is the Cruellest Month, is available for download on our official website and is updated at the release of a new module. I know that there are plans to play it during the upcoming World War Three convention in Seattle, with custom rules for Warsaw Pact obtaining a strategic surprise level. Sounds exciting, and a lot of additional troubles for NATO!

Grant: How many maps are included in this module? What tactical challenges and opportunities are created by the terrain in the Central Front?

Fabrizio: The C3 modules all have one single map, usually covering the Area of Responsibility of one or two NATO Corps.

The US VII Corps AoR is one of the longest, spanning for more than 200 km, and the NATO troops defending it are thinned out, particularly so in the covering forces sector. This offers several initial opportunities for the Warsaw Pact, despite the difficult terrain in the area. Moreover, both sides must come to terms with a not particularly useful road network, as it primarily runs in a North – South direction, providing only limited options for the eastbound movement required by the Warsaw Pact and the westbound routes NATO needs to bring in reinforcements.

Grant: How does combat function in the design?

Fabrizio: The combat value of the units is only a secondary factor, as in modern mechanized warfare the real difference is often made by other considerations: Artillery and air support, engineers, tactical deployment on the battlefield, support on the flanks, training, electronic warfare, command control, reconnaissance, fatigue, available ammunitions just to cite a few. Moreover, nobody knows how effective some of them will be until it’s too late to change things.

In the end, in the C3 Series is not possible to quantify in advance the combat ratios or the exact probabilities of success. As in real life, both sides must plan in more generic terms, like “this attack will probably need support from the flanks, combat engineers, a preparatory bombardment, and three additional battalions of artillery”.

Grant: What is the makeup of the Combat Results Table?

Fabrizio: The CRT is apparently bloodless, as the best result will be to inflict two Attrition Points to the enemy. Problem is, a unit could be attacked multiple times during each 3-hour turns, with each Attrition Point further degrading its combat capabilities. Moreover, a retreat requires disengaging and risking additional attrition. The defender quickly discovers that a couple of Attrition Points on a battalion means that its defending position has been compromised, and trying to hold could quickly bring the unit to disintegrate. The attacker must face similar considerations, with different effects.

Grant: How many campaign games and scenarios are included?

Fabrizio: Four scenarios and two campaign games are included:

  • Just a Second Away, US 2ACR and 1/3I Brigade meet the Soviet 28th Tank Division.
  • Shortcut to Schweinfurt, Soviet 28th Army turns south and clashes with West German 12th PanzerDivision.
  • Where the Forest Whispers, US 3rd Infantry Division faces one Soviet and one Czechoslovakian Army.
  • Operation Marsh Harrier, the NATO strategic counterattack after the arrival of the French forces.
  • The Main Problem, the Warsaw Pact offensive against US VII Corps.
  • One Minute to Midnight, unrestricted nuclear warfare after days of build-up.

Grant: What are the Optional and Campaign victory conditions?

Fabrizio: The standard victory conditions are based on the occupation of geographical objectives, and the destruction of the enemy forces.

An optional set of victory conditions has been developed by Anthony Morphet, based on his first-hand knowledge of the military and political objectives each side really had in a possible conflict during the 80’s. This optional rule is particularly unforgiving for both sides, but I loved it immediately; it’s the ultimate challenge in realism for real Grognards not afraid of losing.

Grant: I chuckled when I read this is in the rules. “…completely ignoring whining arguments about “unbalanced play”. How do your chosen victory conditions overcome Grognard grumbling?

Fabrizio: As stated by the rule, any unmanly and whining argument about unbalanced play is simply ignored! If you are not man enough to face reality, report immediately to Moscow for urgent consultations 😀

Grant: What is next for the C3 Series?

Fabrizio: The last module of the series will be titled Bavarian Rhapsody and will cover the Area of Responsibility of West German II Korps in Southern Germany. After that, the C3 Series will most probably move into the Middle East, where decades of Arab Israeli conflicts await…

Grant: What other games are you working on Fabrizio?

Fabrizio: In the reprint section, a fourth echelon of 1985: Under an Iron Sky will be mobilized this year. On the new offensives front, we are already developing the next module of the Strategikon Series, focused on the Classical period and having The Fate of All as its first volume. Cannot say more right now, I made a vow of silence to Ares!

If you are interested in In a Dark Wood C3 Module 4 – The Hof Gap, you can read a bit more by visiting the game page at the following link: https://trlgames.com/in-a-dark-wood/

If you are interested in reserving a copy, but only if there happen to be any found in the dark and dusty corners of the Quartermaster’s office at CENTCOM, you can email Fabrizio at info@TRLGames.com. Good luck and god speed!

-Grant